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The impact of flexible environmental policy on maritime supply 
chain resilience 
Abstract  
As policy makers acknowledge the high degree of supply chain vulnerability and the impact of 
coastal maritime emissions to coastal population health, there has been a consistent effort to 
strengthen maritime security and environmental regulations. In recent years, supply chain 
hyper-optimization has led to lean and tightly integrated systems with little additional buffers 
and high sensitivity to disruptions. 
This study considers the designation of Emission Control Areas and establishes a link between 
environmental and network resilience performance for maritime supply chains using 
operational cost and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions cost metrics. The proposed methodological framework 
analyzes various abatement options, disruption intensities, fuel pricing instances and regulatory 
strategies (such as the flexible implementation of ECAs). The methodology utilizes a minimum 
cost flow assignment and a link velocity optimization model for vessel speed to establish the 
payoff for various network states. Additionally, an attacker defender game is set up to identify 
optimal regulatory strategies under various disruption scenarios. 
The results are complemented by a sensitivity analysis on 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions pricing, to better equip 
policy makers to manage environmental and resilience legislation. The methodology and 
findings provide a comprehensive analytic approach to optimize maritime supply chain 
performance beyond minimisation of operational costs, to also minimize exposure to costly 
supply chain disruptions. 
 
Keywords: Network resilience, Supply chain management, Emission Control Areas, Attacker-defender game 
1. Introduction 
 
Maritime transportation has a major role in driving economic growth and globalization, as it 
accounts for four fifths of the world’s total merchandise trade (UNCTAD, 2017).  Since 1990, 
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the international merchandise trade volume has been growing twice as fast as the global 
economic growth (WTO, 2016). The excess trade growth may be associated with globalized 
production, increased trade in parts and components, greater economic integration, and deeper 
and wider global supply chains (Berle, 2011). As recognized in the Global Risk Report by the 
World Economic Forum (2016), the increasingly high degree of coupling and interaction 
between sources, stakeholders and processes together with the over-dependence on deeper, 
wider global chains, has made the operation of the international maritime network more 
susceptible to disruptions.  
 
To address this challenge, since the early 2000s, there has been a consistent effort to strengthen 
maritime security through the introduction of several new regulations at global, regional, and 
national levels. Most notably these include, the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) code, other amendments to the International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention 
of 1974, the revised Seafarers’ Identity Documents (SID) Convention of 2003, the Container 
Security Initiative, the 24-hour manifest rule and plans to introduce a global system for the 
long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) of ships. Raymond and Morrien (Lloyd’s MIU, 
2008) recognize that maritime security legislation amendments introduced since 2000 are 
primarily targeted to deal with terrorism threats and have limited impact against other types of 
disruptions. Furthermore, several studies discuss the practical implementation of security 
regulations, criticizing their impractical and overlapping nature, and the lack of a unified 
framework (Acciaro and Sierra, 2013; Bichou, 2008). Berle et al. (2011) recognize that: 
 Practitioners have an operational (rather than strategic focus), therefore, their efforts 
focus on frequent minor disruptions rather than larger accidental events 
 There is awareness that larger events do happen, and know that these are very costly, 
yet they do not prepare systematically to restore the system.  
 
Evidence of costly “non-terrorism” related disruptions associated with the lack of a holistic 
security framework are frequently documented in supply chain resilience literature. From an 
international supply chain perspective, disruptions are found capable of severe and long-lasting 
impact, even when originating at remote locations very “deep in the supply network” 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Supply Chain Digest, 2006). Policies for addressing occasional 
high impact threats (e.g. political disputes and natural disasters) exist mainly at an industry 
specific context. For example, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) member countries are 
required to hold oil stock reserve equivalent to a minimum of ninety days of their net imports 
(IEA, 2007; IEA, 2014). In such cases, resilience is added through introducing slack. Most 
industries though do not have such policies in place. At the same time, supply chain hyper-
optimization leads to lean and tightly integrated systems with little additional buffers and high 
sensitivity to disruptions. 
 
Over-dependence on deeper and wider multinational supply and production chains also has 
environmental implications. The UNCTAD (2017) reported that if seaborne trade continues to 
grow at its current pace and no global action is taken to reduce CO2 emissions in the sector, 
maritime trade and related CO2 emissions would double by 2035. In 2011, the IMO introduced 
a set of global technical and operational measures to control CO2 emissions from international 
shipping, such as the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and the Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (SEEMP), that improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions intensity 
(CO2/tonne-mile). 
 
While the low CO2 emissions figure enhances the argument that maritime shipping is the 
greenest mode of transport, shipping has a more significant contribution to other types of 
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emission pollutants. The sector is responsible for 5-8% of the global SO2 emissions (Eyring et 
al., 2005), and approximately 15% for NOx (Corbett et al., 2007). At the same time, about 60 
thousand deaths related to respiratory health issues near coastlines are correlated to PM 
emissions from shipping. In response, the revised MARPOL Annex VI introduced limits on 
the maximum sulphur content allowed in bunker oil used by ships. This regulation also 
designated Emission Control Areas (ECA) where tighter limits applied. The limits on allowed 
sulphur content will become progressively stricter over the years for activity within and outside 
the ECA as shown in Table 1. 
 
MARPOL designated the Baltic Sea as the first ECA for 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions in 1997 and enforced 
it after 2005, while the following year the North Sea was also designated as an ECA. Two 
newer ECAs include the North American ECA that extends 200 nautical miles (NM) from the 
coasts of North America and the US Caribbean Sea ECA, both of which target PM and NOx 
emissions by setting a maximum limit of NOx emissions per kWh used on-board. The 
regulation suggests that from 2020 onwards, the global limit of sulphur content will be 0.5% 
(outside ECAs) as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Maximum allowed sulphur content (%) 
 
 
 
Cullinane and Bergqvist (2014) encourage the further designation of ECAs due to the various 
socio-economic benefits these bring. However, such regulation increases the operating costs 
for the ship operators as more expensive fuel is required for compliance, or technological 
investments that ensure a similar reduction of 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions. M. Tichavska et. al. (2017) 
propose emission inventories built from AIS vessel tracks to provide policy making support in 
reducing the local and global impact of vessel emissions. Zis and Psaraftis (2017) developed a 
modal choice model to estimate the implications of ECAs on the short-sea shipping sector. 
They showed that modal shifts to land-based modes can be expected should bunker oil prices 
pick up again.  
 
Sulphur content in vessel fuel legislation has been in place in the European Union with the 
2005/33/EC directive that allows only the use of fuel with less than 0.1% sulphur from ships 
at berth in EU ports or when sailing through inland waterways. The use of low sulphur fuel is 
also enforced at a regional level, as for example in California, where from 2012 onwards ocean-
going vessels are required to use 0.1% fuel within 24 NM from the Californian Coast (CARB, 
2012), and by some port authorities that provide incentives for the use of low sulphur fuel in 
their proximity. 
 
The aim of this research is to model the impacts of ECAs on maritime operations at sea, and 
associate them with network resilience performance indicators. Establishing this relationship 
will better equip policy makers to manage environmental and resilience legislation, and supply 
chain operators who consistently seek to minimise operational costs, also minimize their 
exposure to costly supply chain disruptions. 
 
The following Section provides basic definitions and a methodological background for vessel 
emission modelling, describing the relationship between vessel speed, fuel consumption and 
 Year 
Areas 2005-2012 2012-2015 2015-2020 2020- 
Within ECA 1.5 1 0.1 0.1 
Outside ECA 4.5 3.5 3.5 0.5 
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emissions that is key to linking and quantifying emissions regulations impact to maritime 
network resilience. In Section 3, the integrated modelling approach adopted in this work is 
presented and in Section 4 a case study is presented where the proposed modelling framework 
is applied in the context of the oil supply chain, followed by a discussion of findings. In the 
final section conclusions are drawn and suggestions for future research are made. 
 
 
2. Methodological background 
 
2.1. Vessel emission modelling 
To comply with the low sulphur requirements of previous regulations, ship operators can either 
use low sulphur fuel such as Marine Gas Oil (MGO) or invest in newer technologies. One 
option is to equip vessels with scrubber systems that allow operators to use Heavy Fuel Oil 
(HFO), or alternatively invest in dual-fuel engines that permit the use of Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG). For vessels at berth, an additional option that secures compliance with most regulations 
is the use of ‘cold ironing’ where a vessel receives shore power from the grid (Zis et al., 2014). 
All options available to ensure compliance with regulations increase either the capital 
(technological investments) or operating (use of more expensive fuel) costs of running a vessel. 
As a result, the ECAs are anticipated to affect the profitability of a shipping service. 
 
Fuel consumption depends on the fuel efficiency of machinery on-board at its current operating 
levels. Many studies attempt to model fuel consumption at a macroscopic level and do so using 
bottom-up activity methodologies (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2012; Cariou, 2010; Corbett et al., 
2009). A common finding in these studies is that the most significant fuel consumption 
component is during the cruise stage. 
 
For modelling fuel consumption, three main activity modes that require energy are assumed 
for all ships; sailing (S), manoeuvring (M), and berth hoteling (B). For the majority of 
commercial vessels, there are dedicated engines on board that provide the necessary power for 
each activity phase. During sailing, the main engines (m) are operating to propel the vessel, 
while at the same time auxiliary engines (α) are running to cover the vessel’s electricity 
demands (heating, lighting, refrigerating, pumps etc.). In some vessels, the energy for activities 
other than propulsion may be taken from the main engines when a shaft generator is used 
(Prousalidis et al., 2005). While the ship is manoeuvring to approach and depart from a port, 
the main engines are usually switched off and the auxiliary engines are running on higher loads 
to provide redundancy. Large vessels may require the assistance of tugboats during this activity 
phase, while at some ports a pilot must board the vessel at a certain distance from the port to 
lead the manoeuvring operation. Finally, when the vessel is at berth the auxiliary engines are 
operating to cover the electric demands of the vessel, and normally the main engines are 
switched off for long berth durations (typically 4 hours and above). Another type of machinery 
that contributes to the overall fuel consumption of a port to port journey is the auxiliary boilers 
(b) which are used whenever the main engines are switched off, and are responsible to maintain 
the fuel and main engine cylinder temperatures at the desired levels (Zis et al, 2014). The fuel 
consumption 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝐴,𝑘 (kg) for machinery of type e, on-board vessel k, during activity A is given 
by equation 1: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑒,𝐴,𝑘 = 10
−3 ∙ 𝑆𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑒,𝐴,𝑘 ∙ 𝐸𝐿𝑒,𝐴,𝑘 ∙ 𝐸𝑃𝑒,𝑘 ∙ 𝑡𝐴,𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 = {𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑏}. , 𝐴 ∈ {𝑆,𝑀, 𝐵} (1) 
 
where: 
𝑆𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑒,𝐴,𝑘 denotes the specific fuel oil consumption for the engine (g of fuel per kWh), 
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𝐸𝐿𝑒,𝐴,𝑘 (%) is the engine load expressed as percentage of the maximum continuous rating 
(MCR) of the engine,  
𝐸𝑃𝑒,𝑘  (kW) is the nominal engine power installed 
and 𝑡𝐴,𝑘 (hours) is the duration of the engine’s activity.  
 
Summing over the fuel consumption of each type of machinery operating during the different 
activities, will lead to the estimation of the fuel consumption per voyage. The engine loads for 
the auxiliary engines and boilers vary significantly from 10% to 60% (Khersonsky et al, 2007) 
and depend on the trip, cargo type, port, and weather. The most fuel demanding activity is 
sailing, where the load of the propulsion engines may reach 70% to 90%, depending on the 
sailing speed chosen. In the past, most engines were designed to have their optimal efficiency 
at 70-85% of MCR, however in recent years with the re-emergence of slow steaming the 
engines may run as low as 30% of MCR with even lower values suggested for super slow 
steaming instances (Maloni et al., 2013). This considerable change is attributed to the 
dependence of required output power with sailing speed. Most studies in the literature have 
been using the propeller law, which assumes an exponential relationship between engine load 
(𝐸𝐿) and sailing speed (𝑉) . For example, the engine loads 𝐸𝐿𝑚,𝑆1,𝑘 and 𝐸𝐿𝑚,𝑆2,𝑘of the main 
engine m of vessel k at two different sailing speeds 𝑉𝑆1 ad 𝑉𝑆2 are linked as follows in equation 
2 where n is the exponent used: 
 
𝐸𝐿𝑚,𝑆1,𝑘
𝐸𝐿𝑚,𝑆2,𝑘
= (
𝑉𝑆1
𝑉𝑆2
)
𝑛
            (2) 
 
As a rule of thumb, n takes a value of 3, and therefore a cubic relationship applies (Ronen, 
1982). For increased accuracy, a higher exponent is suggested for faster sailing speeds, and 
specific ship types, reaching a value of 4.5-5 for fast containerships (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 
2013).  
The propeller law explains why sailing at lower speeds has been occurring in recent years with 
the higher fuel prices. The optimal sailing speed problem was first defined on the basis of trade-
offs between lower fuel costs and loss of vessel revenues associated with lower speeds (Ronen, 
1982). This practice, commonly known as slow steaming, mitigates fuel costs during crises or 
when excess capacity exists in the shipping market (Benford, 1981). There are additional 
environmental benefits due to slow steaming, and it has been shown that despite an increase in 
the number of trips to meet the supply required, the lower sailing speed results in emissions 
savings (Cariou, 2010). Considering an individual tanker vessel that carries a main engine of 
32000 kW and auxiliary power of 4500kW (very large crude carrier – VLCC), the fuel 
consumption per NM travelled for each type of machinery during cruise is depicted in Figure 
1 (left y-axis).  
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Figure 1: Fuel consumption per NM and SFOC variation at different sailing speeds (Data source: Man Diesel (2012) 
 
The graph also shows the variation of SFOC (right y-axis) at the different speeds, which is 
shown to be suboptimal at lower loads. Despite the lesser efficiency, the fuel consumption is 
reducing at lower sailing speeds due to the less demand for power. Figure 1 also shows that the 
fuel consumption per NM for the auxiliary engine (grey line) is increasing at lower speeds, 
which is justified from the assumption that the energy requirements on-board are not depending 
on speed. Using equations 1 and 2 a connection between fuel consumption, vessel energy 
efficiency and vessel speed during various voyage activity modes is established that indicates 
vessel configuration under various service speeds. This enables the environmental performance 
of the network to be determined in periods of low and high demand and for any environmental 
legislation, which affects the selected operating profile of the engines. 
 
2.2. Models for maritime supply chain resilience 
The visibility of individual businesses along the operations of a supply chain tends to be limited 
to two or three chain links (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012). At the same time the fragmentation of 
supply processes and increasing chain depth, reduce further that visibility threshold, and when 
a disruption occurs beyond it, little can be done by unprepared individual stakeholders to 
withhold it. Although, production economics literature has highlighted the importance of 
information exchange with supply chain partners, Lai et. al. (2015) illustrate that there are 
limited cost benefits by exchanging environmental management information.  
 
Studies focusing on the shipping aspect of supply chain vulnerability have relied mostly on 
complex network models, which can be classified as either pure-topological or flow-based 
models (Ouyang et. al., 2014; Lhomme, 2015; Cox et. al., 2011; Reggiani, 2013). The majority 
of pure-topological models assess disrupted network performance using metrics such as 
network density, average degree, centrality of components, maximum and minimum distances, 
connectivity, correlation, and clustering (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Duceret and Zaidi, 
2012). Kim et al (2015) use a pure-topological approach and define disruptions at arc-, node- 
and network- level, to establish that for networks of unweighted links, scale free supply 
structures offer better resilience. Pure-topological models adopt binary network representations 
(e.g. link available or not) to rank critical components (Angeloudis, et. al., 2007; Duceret, et. 
al., 2010). Furthermore, Sullivan et al. (2010) argue that the main problem of pure-topological 
models is the creation of isolated sub-networks that are inaccessible after component removal. 
Such approach cannot be applied to evaluate the impact of disruptions on network capacity, 
travel times or processing times (Qiao, et. al., 2014), nor to quantify any costs of cargo 
rerouting. These limitations can severely restrict studies on maritime supply chain operations, 
where partial disruptions are more frequent than complete failures and, isolated subnetworks 
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are less likely in maritime supply chains operations, as vessels and cargoes can be rerouted. In 
contrast, flow-based models use costs, operational and physical constraints, to capture the 
redistribution of commodity flows subject to capacity limitations, integral to existing network 
configurations1. 
 
Sheffi and Rice (2005) who examine supply chain resilience from an enterprise perspective, 
suggest that resilience can be achieved by either creating redundancy or increasing flexibility. 
While redundancy is part of every resilience strategy, it represents sheer cost with limited 
benefit unless when a network is disrupted. Focusing on maritime operations, fleet operational 
capacity is defined as a function of deadweight tonnage and vessel speed. It can therefore be 
increased, either by shipbuilding or increasing vessel speed. With increasing vessel speed being 
the only viable short-term measure, Zavitsas (2011) argues that the concept is reverse to slow 
steaming. When slow-steaming takes place, maritime operations have high redundancy, which 
can be utilised instantly by increasing vessel speed offering resilience to the network. 
 
2.3. Linking environmental policy to network resilience performance 
In maritime supply chain operations, when an optimal maritime link is disrupted, flow is 
rerouted to a less optimal, typically longer route. Assuming that vessel speed remains the same, 
the travel time to serve the same origin destination route will increase, and round-trip frequency 
will reduce. A link disruption influences all vessels whose route goes through that link. The 
total disruption impact is, therefore, proportional to the carrying capacity of the fleet influenced 
and the delay the rerouting causes. 
 
As shown by equation 2 fuel consumption and vessel emissions are directly linked to vessel 
speed too. A link can therefore be made between maritime fleet speed to maritime supply chain 
capacity redundancy, and environmental emissions. The relationship presented in Figure 2 is a 
bi-directional one as when one component changes all others increase or decrease as well. As 
discussed in Section 2.2, in the long term, shipbuilding capability can also assist in overcoming 
the impact of a link disruption. Although, this research focuses on short-term response, the 
long-term cycle is also illustrated in Figure 2. To capture adjacent components (linked by an 
arrow ‘‘→’’) type of association in Figure 2, the symbol ‘‘+’’ after a variable is used to indicate 
a concurrent relationship with the following variable of the chain, while the symbol ‘‘−’’ 
implies an opposite relationship. The components illustrated in Figure 2 are applicable both at 
individual vessel and maritime fleet levels. 
 
Short-term cycle: Emissions +⃗⃗  Fuel consumption +⃗⃗  Average speed +⃗⃗  Operational capacity 
+⃗⃗  Level of redundancy +⃗⃗  Resilience 
 
Long-term cycle: Operational capacity −⃗⃗  Shipbuilding +⃗⃗  Fleet tonnage +⃗⃗  Operational 
capacity 
 
The short-term cycle describes the instantaneous changes in environmental performance and 
resilience respectively (shown in continuous line links in Figure 2). The long-term cycle can 
be expressed in the following way: “Operational capacity deficit will yield shipbuilding to 
scrapping ratio > 1, which will yield higher fleet tonnage”. 
                                                 
1 The reader is referred to Levalle and Nof (2014), Perea et al. (2015) and Achurra-Gonzalez, 
et.al. (2016) for a more detailed literature review and discussion on flow-based approaches for 
supply chain resilience assessment. 
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Figure 2: Short- and long-term associations to changes in maritime fleet speed 
 
This research assumes that the stricter environmental regulations (such as the introduction of 
ECAs) can be handled by ship operators through a reduction of average vessel speed as a coping 
mechanism. Recent research suggests that only ship operators that sail almost exclusively 
within ECAs may invest in scrubber retrofits (Zis and Psaraftis, 2018). In this paper, within the 
examined networks the tanker fleet is only spending 13% of their time within ECAs, and 
therefore we can safely assume that ship operators will use fuel switching to comply with the 
regulation. Therefore, the sulphur content restriction is expected to assimilate the effects 
observed in slow steaming instances to some extent due to the overall higher operating costs 
stemming from the regulation leading to a lower optimal sailing speed. The modelling 
framework proposed in this research consists of a minimum cost flow assignment model 
(MCFAM), a supply chain resilience game model (SCRGM) using game theory attacker-
defender models to capture legislative and disruption choices and a link velocity optimization 
model (LVOM). The framework captures the operational expenses and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions cost for 
various disruption scenarios and regulatory frameworks, and it is used to consider a flexible 
approach in the implementation of environmental policy. 
 
 
3. Modelling framework 
 
The modelling framework proposed in this research integrates the MCFAM, SCRGM and 
LVOM to form two separate loops as illustrated in Figure 3, aligned so that one model’s output 
feeds to another model as input. A macroscopic modelling approach is adopted in this research, 
to maintain tractability of the model even in large scale network applications that supply chains 
typically are. 
 
Average speed
Operational 
capacity
Emissions
Fleet size (dwt 
tonnage)
Fuel 
consumption
Level of 
redundancy
Resilience
Shipbuilding to 
scrapping ratio 
> 1
Instantaneous link (short term)
Long term link
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Table 2: MCFAM, SCRGM and LVOM notation 
       Sets  Indices  
𝐴 All arcs    𝑖 Starting node  
𝑉 All nodes   𝑗 Ending node  
𝐿 Land transport modes   𝑚 Mode of transport  
𝑊 Maritime transport modes    𝑞 Commodity  
𝑅 All regions within a link   𝑘 Intermediate node  
𝐸 All machinery on board   𝑟 
Region within link (ECA/ 
No ECA) 
 
𝛱 Payoff matrix   𝑒 
Engine type (main/ aux./ 
boiler) 
 
𝑆𝑛 Conductor mixed strategies   𝜎 Conductor pure strategies  
𝑆𝑚 Disruptor mixed strategies   𝜅 Disruptor pure strategies  
Parameters  
𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑚 Arc (𝑖, 𝑗)distance when mode 𝑚 is used  
𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 Unit cost when commodity 𝑞 flows in arc (𝑖, 𝑗) using mode 𝑚  
𝑢𝑖,𝑗 Shared arc capacity for all land transport modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝐿 when arc (𝑖, 𝑗) is fully operational  
𝑢𝑖,𝑗
′  Disrupted arc capacity  
𝑢𝑚,𝑞 Fleet capacity for all maritime transport modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝑊  
𝐸𝐿 Vessel engine energy level  
𝑢𝑘 Capacity of processing facility  
𝑆% Percentage of sulphur content in fuel  
𝐷𝑟  Length of region 𝑟 in NM   
𝑃𝑟  Price of fuel in region 𝑟 in $/tonne  
𝐸𝑃𝑒 Nominal installed power of engine 𝑒  
Decision variables  
𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 Flow of commodity 𝑞 assigned to arc(𝑖, 𝑗) using mode 𝑚 
𝑧𝐸𝐿 Uniform factor on maritime fleet 𝐸𝐿 
𝑉𝑟  Sailing speed in region 𝑟 
𝑋∗ Conductor optimal mixed strategy decision vector 
𝑌∗ Disruptor optimal mixed strategy decision vector 
Auxiliary variables  
𝐸𝐿 Engine load as % MCR  
𝑧𝐸𝐿 Uniform factor on maritime fleet 𝐸𝐿  
𝑆𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑒 Specific fuel oil consumption of engine 𝑒 in g/kWh  
𝑉𝑚,𝑞  Universal fleet speed  
𝑎𝜎𝜅 Game payoff for conductor strategy 𝜎 and disruptor strategy 𝜅  
 
3.1. Minimum cost flow assignment (MCFAM) 
A minimum cost flow assignment model is used to capture the trade flows of a global supply 
chain network, and the rerouting that occurs when a component is disrupted. The formulation 
for the multi-origin, multi-destination, multi-mode and multi-commodity flow assignment 
assumes that every supply chain is modelled as a network of nodes 𝑉 that represent ports, or 
processing facilities, and directed arcs 𝐴. Arcs are indicated by (𝑖, 𝑗), listing a starting node 𝑖, 
and an ending node 𝑗. Arcs have a unique distance 𝑑𝑖,𝑗, and a cost 𝑐(𝑖,𝑗),𝑚,𝑞 applies when 
commodity 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄 and mode 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, flows in arc (𝑖, 𝑗) that resembles fuel costs per trip. The 
set of modes 𝑀 consists of land transport modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝐿, and water transport modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝑊, so 
that 𝑀 = 𝐿 ∪ 𝑊. The decision variable 𝑓(𝑖,𝑗),𝑚,𝑞 is the flow of commodity 𝑞 assigned to arc 
(𝑖, 𝑗) using mode 𝑚. Arc capacity is denoted by 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 for all land transport modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝐿 when 
arc is fully operational, while it is considered unlimited for water transport models 𝑚 ∈ 𝑊. To 
account for the disruption game described in Section 3.3, disrupted arc capacity 𝑢𝑖,𝑗
′  is defined 
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for all modes 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀. To account for fleet capacity on maritime links 𝑚 ∈ 𝑊, 𝑢𝑚,𝑞 is also 
defined. The demand of commodity 𝑞 at each node 𝑘 ∈ 𝑉 is defined to be 𝑏𝑘,𝑞. The capacity 
of a processing facility at node 𝑘 ∈ 𝑉 is defined as 𝑢𝑘. To solve this as a linear program, a 
heuristic approach is adopted for calculating and updating unit cost 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 for maritime links 
𝑚 ∈ 𝑊. Initially, it is assumed that all vessels operate at slow steaming conditions using 𝐸𝐿 =
40%. By using the propeller law shown in equation 2 this can be translated to a fleet sailing 
speed, fuel consumption that informs 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 and vessel emissions. Then, the following 
minimum cost flow assignment problem can be solved: 
 
min
𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴𝑚𝑞        (3) 
 
Subject to: 
∑ ∑ 𝑓(𝑖,𝑘),𝑚,𝑞𝑖𝑚 − ∑ ∑ 𝑓(𝑘,𝑗),𝑚,𝑞𝑗𝑚 = 𝑏𝑘,𝑞  for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄  (4) 
 
∑ ∑ 𝑓(𝑖,𝑗),𝑚,𝑞𝑞𝑚 ≤ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗
′      for all (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴,𝑚 ∈ 𝐿 (5) 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑢𝑘     for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝑉   (6) 
 
𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 ≥ 0      for all 𝑞,𝑚, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴  (7) 
 
Constraint 4 ensures the conservation of flow at all network nodes, while constraint 5 ensures 
the capacity of land modes arcs is not exceeded. Constraint 6 ensures the throughput capacity 
of intermediate nodes is not exceeded, while constraint 7 ensures non-negative flows. 
Furthermore, the maritime travel demand for each commodity 𝑞 should always be lower than 
the fleet capacity available as expressed by equation 8.   
 
∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞(𝑖,𝑗) ≤ 𝑢𝑚,𝑞      for all 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄,𝑚 ∈ 𝑊  (8) 
 
Fleet capacity 𝑢𝑚,𝑞 is a function of the average fleet speed 𝑉𝑚,𝑞(𝐸𝐿) as described in Section 
2.3. By expressing fleet capacity, as a function of engine load (𝐸𝐿) as shown in equation 9, the 
minimum 𝐸𝐿 to satisfy maritime travel demand can be determined. 
 
𝑢𝑚,𝑞 = 𝑑𝑤𝑡𝑚,𝑞  ×  𝑉𝑚,𝑞(𝐸𝐿)    for all 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄,𝑚 ∈ 𝑊  (9) 
 
As discussed in Section 2.1, 𝐸𝐿 is typically 70-85% at nominal sailing speed. In slow steaming 
conditions 𝐸𝐿 can go down to 30%. The proposed MCFAM assumes 𝐸𝐿 is common across the 
fleet, and if the 𝐸𝐿 value exceeds 100%, the problem is deemed unsolvable, as the fleet capacity 
redundancy is not sufficient to satisfy excess maritime travel demand. After obtaining the 𝐸𝐿 
required to satisfy fleet capacity for each instance of the network examined (disrupted or not 
disrupted), a uniform factor 𝑧𝐸𝐿 is assumed so that: 
 
𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑧𝐸𝐿 × 𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔       (10) 
 
The maritime link costs 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑞 are updated using the propeller law of equation 2 and the 𝐸𝐿 
factor 𝑧𝐸𝐿  calculated by equation 10 to evaluate the updated network cost for satisfying all 
supply demand. By using the updated 𝐸𝐿 and average fleet speed 𝑉𝑚,𝑞(𝐸𝐿), maritime fleet 
emissions are also determined. The total transport cost as determined by the MCFAM considers 
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maritime fleet and land modes (e.g. pipelines) operational costs and emissions cost. Route 
flows act as inputs to the SCRGM and LVOM models that compose the rest of the proposed 
methodological framework. In the current state of the model, sailing speed varies uniformly, 
however, the consequences of a universal fleet speed on port congestion are not considered. 
One approach that should be incorporated in the liner shipping network case, is the one in 
Golias et. al. (2014), that considers berth scheduling and minimizes port congestion.  
 
The generation of harmful pollutant emissions can be easily estimated based on the fuel 
consumption of each vessel activity (sailing, manoeuvring, at-berth) and multiplying with an 
appropriate emissions factor. In this work, the focus is only on 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions as these are the 
targets of the ECA regulation. The generated emissions are found by multiplying the fuel 
consumption with 0.02 S% where S% is the percentage of sulphur present in the fuel. In this 
work we assume that S=0.1 within ECAs (to comply with the regulation) and S=3.5 outside 
ECAs (the current maximum sulphur content allowed), while all auxiliary engines always use 
fuel with S=0.1. The benefit of the regulation is the reduced SOx emissions that may impact 
health of local population affected, lead to acid rain, and have various other environmental 
effects. To incorporate the benefit of reduced SOx emissions in our modelling framework, we 
consider the external costs associated with this pollutant. 
 
The process of internalizing external costs is a policy measure that has been contemplated in 
the past, and there have been various studies attempting to identify the so called “damage costs” 
of various pollutants. As a baseline and starting point value, we consider the external cost of 
transport as 10.96$ per kg of SOx emitted in sea areas as calculated in the handbook of 
estimation on external costs (Ricardo-AEA, 2014). This value is not paid by the polluter, but it 
can be used as a means to quantify the benefits of the regulation in environmental terms. It 
should be noted that during shipping activities there are other pollutants generated which also 
can be quantified in monetary terms using external costs. In addition, there are environmental 
trade-offs that must not be neglected; for instance, measures that reduce SOx emissions have 
been proven to increase CO2 emissions. However, in the context of this paper we only consider 
monetary values for sulphur emissions.  
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Figure 3: Performance assessment framework for eco-friendly and risk averse maritime network operation 
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3.2. Link velocity optimization model (LVOM) 
 
Since the introduction of ECAs, the calculation of fuel cost has become more complex. For the 
links that contain legs within and outside ECAs, the vessel may have to switch fuel if it is not 
equipped with other abatement options (e.g. scrubber systems). In this case, an optimization 
problem can be formulated with the objective of minimizing total fuel costs within a specific 
link. 
 
 
Figure 4: The speed differentiation problem 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the speed differentiation problem where the decision variables are the 
sailing speed at each leg where a different fuel requirement applies. The main parameters of 
the problem are the fuel prices within an ECA (PECA) and outside (PO-ECA) and the respective 
sailing distances (DECA and DO-ECA). It should be noted that apart from speed differentiation, 
the ECA refraction problem has been proposed by Fagerholt and Psaraftis (2015), whereby the 
objective is to minimize the sailing distance within ECAs. The speed differentiation problem 
in the presence of ECA has been considered from an environmental perspective in previous 
studies (Doudnikoff et al., 2014) to show that there are increased CO2 emissions, and in 
conjunction with speed limits near ports to illustrate that ECAs may complement such port 
authority initiatives (Zis et al., 2015). This research uses a simplified formulation of the latter  
study for each link q that consists of legs r of set R={ECA, O-ECA, ECA..} and considers the 
fuel consumption of each onboard machinery e of set E during sailing activity S. 
 
min
𝑉𝑟
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑟 ∙ 10
−6 ∙
𝐷𝑟
𝑉𝑟
∙ (𝐸𝑃𝑒 ∙ 𝐸𝐿𝑒 ∙ 𝑆𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑒)𝑒∈𝐸𝑟∈𝑅      (11) 
 
Subject to: 
𝑉𝑟 ≤ 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥      for all 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅    (12) 
 
𝑉𝑟 ≥ 0       for all 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅    (13) 
 
∑
𝐷𝑟
𝑉𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅 =
∑ 𝐷𝑟𝑟∈𝑅
𝑉𝑚,𝑞
         (14) 
 
Constraint 12 ensures that the sailing speed at any leg cannot exceed the maximum allowed 
speed 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 for the vessel. Constraint 13 is a non-negativity constraint for the sailing speed. 
Constraint 14 ensures that the total sailing time at the link is the same as the original (e.g. 
without speed differentiation and sailing at all legs within a link with 𝑉𝑚,𝑞 as calculated from 
ECA
Port
Port
A
ECA
Port
Port
B
Outside ECA
Maneuvering Zone
PECA ,DECA PO-ECA ,DO-ECA PECA ,DECA
VsECA VsECA
Maneuvering Zone
VsO-ECA
Parameters
Decision Variables
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the MCFAM model). The maximum sailing speed 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥of a vessel is assumed to be for MCR 
at 100 %. In reality, a vessel can sail at higher than 100 % MCR loads for limited periods of 
time during emergencies, but not more than 1 hour for each 12 hours of activity to avoid engine 
damage (Man Diesel, 2014). The proposed optimization problem is non-linear due to the power 
law dependency of the engine load to sailing speed. However, the objective function is convex 
monotonic and as a result, the problem can be easily solved with commercial solvers following 
linearization of the objective function. All other variables in the speed differentiation problem 
are taken from equation 1 in section 2.1. 
 
3.3. Supply chain resilience game (SCRGM) 
 
To establish what is the optimal operator and regulator strategy (assuming the two can act as a 
single entity), an attacked defender model is proposed. The game is set as a two-player, non-
cooperative, constant sum, mixed strategy, complete information, instantaneous game. The 
integrated operator and regulator player, we call the “conductor”, can choose out of three pure 
strategies: Strategy 1 is a baseline scenario, where the conductor operates the network 
minimizing operational cost and complying with ECA regulations. Strategy 2 is an enhanced 
operation scenario, where the conductor operates the network minimizing operational cost, 
complying with ECA regulations, and using the LVOM to do so in a reduced cost way. Strategy 
3 resembles an emergency operation scenario, where the conductor operates the network 
minimizing operational cost and not complying with ECA regulations. The components of the 
three strategies available to the conductor are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Conductor set of strategies and each strategy’s components 
Conductor 
Strategy 𝑖 
Minimize 
operational 
cost 
(MCFAM) 
Comply 
with ECA 
regulations 
Optimize 
link 
velocities 
(LVOM) 
1 X X  
2 X X X 
3 X   
 
The disruptor strategies involve disrupting one of the network components (either of arcs 𝐴 or 
nodes 𝑉). Although the proposed framework does not restrict the capabilities of the disruptor 
as to which one, it is noted that disruptions can be either complete or partial. For complete 
disruptions 𝑢𝑖,𝑗
′ = 0, while for partial disruptions arc capacity is reduced so that 𝑢𝑖,𝑗
′ ≤ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗. In 
a similar manner the analytic framework can also account for the disruption of fleet capacity 
𝑢𝑚,𝑞. To capture the resilience options for the conductor more vividly, the analysis assumes 
two intensity levels for the disruptor. Intensity 1 resembles disruptions as caused by Nature, 
where all disruptions have an equal likelihood and therefore delivering a sub-optimal. Intensity 
2 resembles terrorist type disruptions, where the disruptor tries to maximize his payoff. 
 
The payoff matrix 𝛱 = (𝑎𝜎𝜅), where 𝜎 and  𝜅 are the indexes for the conductor and disruptor 
pure strategies respectively, is populated using the MCFAM described in Section 3.1, and the 
LVOM described in Section 3.2. In this mixed strategy game, the probabilities of choice of 
each strategy represent time (or duration). For the disruptor this is associated to the likelihood 
of the network being in a specific state of disruption while for the conductor to the likelihood 
of the network being under a specific regulatory and operational state. The mixed strategy 
vector for the conductor is 𝑋 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛=3) where 𝑋 ∈ 𝑆𝑛 and for the disruptor 𝑌 =
(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑚), where 𝑌 ∈ 𝑆𝑚. In mixed strategy games 𝑥1 and 𝑦1 represent the strategy choice 
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probabilities for each player respectively. As discussed there are three pure strategies available 
to the conductor, while 𝑚 is equal to the number of disreputable network components. Then, 
the expected payoff of the game can be defined by: 
 
𝐸(𝑋, 𝑌) = ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝜎𝑎𝜎𝜅𝑦𝜅
𝑛
𝜅=1
3
𝜎=1 = 𝑋𝛱𝑌
𝑇      (15) 
 
Using the above definitions, the supply chain resilience game formulation can be developed.  
 
max
𝑦𝜅
min
𝑥𝜎
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝜎𝑎𝜎𝜅𝑦𝜅
𝑚
𝜅=1
3
𝜎=1         (16) 
 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑥𝜎
3
𝜎=1 = 1          (17) 
 
∑ 𝑦𝜅
𝑚
𝜅=1 = 1          (18) 
 
𝑥𝜎 , 𝑦𝜅 ≥ 0      for all 𝑥𝜎 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦𝜅 ∈ 𝑌  (19) 
 
Constraints 17 and 18 ensure that the total probability assigned to each players strategies does 
not exceed 100%, and constraint 19 ensures that no negative probabilities are assigned. The 
saddle point of the game of probability vectors 𝑋∗ ∈ 𝑆3 and 𝑌
∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑚, is where equilibrium 
occurs so that the criterion illustrated in equation 20 is satisfied. 
 
𝐸(𝑋, 𝑌∗) ≤ 𝐸(𝑋∗, 𝑌∗) ≤ 𝐸(𝑋∗, 𝑌)   for all 𝑋 ∈ 𝑆3, 𝑌 ∈ 𝑆𝑚   (20) 
 
 
4. Case study 
 
The methodological framework presented in Section 3 is applied to a simplified version of the 
global oil supply chain. The international oil supply chain, is a well-monitored network with 
sufficient availability of macroscopic data, such as international oil flows, exporting and 
importing regions, locations of processing facilities like refineries, maritime and land 
distances. 
 
4.1. A miniature oil supply chain model 
The miniature network set up for this case study is illustrated in Figure 5 and the data inputs 
used are summarized in Table 4 and Table 5 below.  
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Figure 5: Miniature oil supply chain model with crude oil and oil products transport legs 
 
The supply chain, consists of three source nodes, five sink nodes and seven intermediate 
processing nodes that represent oil refineries. The two commodities 𝑞 transported are crude 
and product oil, and the modes 𝑚 available for the transport legs are assumed to be only 
pipelines and maritime links as illustrated in Figure 5. The throughputs assumed for the source 
and sink node flows 𝑏𝑘,𝑞, the distances between all nodes and the refineries capacity 𝑢𝑘 are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Arc distances & ECA percentages in parenthesis (pipeline arcs underlined), refinery throughputs, source and sink 
node flows  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bk 
a/A 5000 200 11431 
(22.7) 
11503 
(22.5) 
17087 
(34.7) 
10038 
(22.1) 
2179 a: -9.87 
A: 2.917 
b/B 15937 
(16.3) 
11624 
(22.3) 
200 100 2000 13983 
(5.3) 
9923 
(20.5) 
b: -7.46/ 
B: 20.8 
c/C 14528 
(15.3) 
10215 
(21.8) 
13967 
(2.7) 
14040 
(2.6) 
19207 
(24.1) 
200 8051 
(13.8) 
c: -11/ 
C: 2 
D 6678 
(100) 
2414 
(100) 
9966 
(22.3) 
10039 
(22.1) 
15533 
(33.4) 
8110 
(13.7) 
300 2.518 
E 13256 
(8.38) 
8993 
(12.36) 
12745 
(2.91) 
12817 
(2.89) 
17984 
(19.6) 
1656 
(0) 
6829 
(21.7) 
0.095 
uk 3 2 7 9 5 3 2.5 
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In Table 5, the unit costs for all modes and commodities are presented for various vessel speeds. 
The capacity of pipeline arcs 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 is assumed to be unlimited while vessels’ and fleet capacities 
are obtained based on tanker fleet data (UNCTAD, 2017) on size, tonnage and classification. 
Although vessels vary in size, for the calculation of unit costs a representative standardized 
vessel type and size is assumed. For crude oil transport, the standard is assumed to be a 250000 
dwt VLCC vessel; while for product oil transport the standard is a 70000 dwt Panamax Product 
tanker. Due to the small size of the modelled network and its sensitivity to sways of demand, 
it is assumed that the tanker fleet can be utilized both towards crude and product oil 
transportation. 
 
Table 5: Arc unit costs (USD/ m bbl km) per vessel speed for average fuel pricing scenario (MGO: 700$/t, HFO: 400$/t)  
𝒎,𝒒 FUEL  SAILING SPEED (KNOTS)   
 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 umq uij 
  𝒄𝒊,𝒋,𝒎,𝒒 (USD/m bbl km)   
VLCC  
(250000 DWT) 
HFO 22 26 30 35 40 45 51 56 
104 
 
MGO 39 46 53 61 69 79 88 99  
PANAMAX 
PRODUCT  
(70000 DWT) 
HFO 26 30 34 39 44 49 55 62  
MGO 45 52 59 68 77 86 97 108  
PIPELINE 
(crude & 
product) 
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For maritime shipments, the unit cost per tonne-NM is assumed to be higher for product tankers 
due to typically smaller vessel size. The unit cost values illustrated in Table 5 are obtained 
assuming fuel prices (FP1) MGO: 700$/t and HFO: 400$/t. To account for the variation in fuel 
price, the analysis is repeated for a high fuel price scenario (FP2) that assumes MGO: 1025$/t 
and HFO: 650$/t, and a low fuel price scenario (FP3) that assumes MGO: 380$/t and HFO: 
190$/t.  
 
Each link’s unit cost is measured for each route and scenario separately depending on the links 
length within ECA, where only MGO fuel can be used. The location of all nodes in the real 
world is only important for calculating the mileage each arc covers within an ECA zone. 
Therefore, it can be said that nodes “a” and “A” represent St. Petersburg of Russia, “b” and 
“B” represent Houston of United States of America, “c” and “C” represent Jeddah of Saudi 
Arabia, “D” represents Hamburg of Germany, and “E” Limassol of Cyprus. Refinery nodes 
“1” and “2” represent Angarsk and Kirishi refineries of Russia respectively, “3”, “4” and “5” 
represent Port Arthur, Texas City, and Carson refineries of United States of America 
respectively, “6” represents Rabigh refinery of Saudi Arabia and “7” represents 
Wilhelmshaven refinery of Germany. The ECA percentages are illustrated in Table 4.  
 
The results from the application of the link speed optimization model (LVOM) show that the 
fuel cost per trip is minimized with a significant speed differential between regulated and non-
regulated waters. This differential increases for instances where the regulated leg is short in 
comparison to the full voyage distance. This can be attributed to the fact that there is a longer 
leg in which the vessel can speed up to maintain its schedule. Comparing the differences in 
fuel prices, it is observed that at lower prices there is greater variation in the speeds as the 
relative difference is higher (MGO 90% higher, whereas in 2014 it was 55% higher). However, 
it should be noted that the speed differentiation leads to increased fuel consumption overall, 
and therefore more CO2 emissions are generated per trip, while within the ECA even lower 
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SO2 emissions will be observed. Therefore, the designation of ECA brings environmental 
consequences by reducing sulphur emissions in two ways at a cost of higher carbon emissions, 
and also leads to negative economic implications to the ship operators. 
 
Table 6: OpEx pyoffs for average fuel pricing scenario and universal fleet speed for all strategy 𝒊 and 𝒋 combinations 
OpEx Payoff (Speed adjusted OpEx) Universal fleet speed (knots) 
Disruptor  
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 
1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA  1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA 
None 5.22 5.17 4.92 None 11.97 11.97 11.97 
a1 6.18 6.11 5.75 a1 12.52 12.52 12.52 
a2 5.41 5.36 5.12 a2 11.97 11.97 11.97 
a7 7.05 6.95 6.47 a7 12.91 12.91 12.91 
b4 5.24 5.19 4.94 b4 11.98 11.98 11.98 
b5 7.36 7.26 6.61 b5 12.94 12.94 12.89 
c6 8.76 8.68 8.31 c6 13.76 13.76 13.76 
1A 6.18 6.11 5.74 1A 12.52 12.52 12.52 
2A 5.41 5.36 5.12 2A 11.97 11.97 11.97 
3B 31.18 27.91 28.24 3B 18.69 18.69 18.69 
4B 65.7 33.89 59.02 4B 22.5 22.5 22.5 
5B 15.73 15.5 14.2 5B 15.71 15.71 15.71 
6C 9.23 9.15 8.75 6C 13.85 13.85 13.85 
7D 6.3 6.24 5.83 7D 12.44 12.44 12.44 
a4 5.22 5.17 4.93 a4 11.97 11.97 11.97 
c3 5.24 5.19 4.94 c3 11.98 11.98 11.98 
c4 6.13 6.05 5.58 c4 12.43 12.43 12.4 
2D 5.22 5.17 4.93 2D 11.97 11.97 11.97 
6E 5.34 5.29 5.04 6E 12.04 12.04 12.04 
All other 5.22 5.17 4.92 All other 11.97 11.97 11.97 
 
The fleet capacity for tankers (both product and crude oil), shown in Table 5 is obtained by 
running a baseline scenario that assumes there is no network disruption, the ECAs regulation 
is in place and, universal fleet speed is 12 knots. For the baseline scenario the total speed 
adjusted operational cost is found to be 5.22 m$ and, the 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions cost is 1.61 m$. The 
fleet capacity required to satisfy demand (assuming 12knots vessel speed) is 104 million dwt. 
By running the MCFAM and LVOM repeatedly using Excel Solver the payoff matrix 
illustrated in Table 6 is populated considering all disruptor and conductor strategies. 
 
In this case study the disruptor is assumed capable to fully disrupt one network arc at a time. 
Node and partial disruptions are not considered. Out of the 56 disruption scenarios considered 
only for the 18 shown in Table 6, a change in payoff was observed. For all others the same 
payoff to the baseline scenario (no disruption) was observed and are grouped together under 
“all other”. For disruption scenarios 3B and 4B, the average fleet vessel speed obtained exceeds 
the maximum feasible 𝐸𝐿, and therefore represents disruptions that cannot be addressed solely 
by increasing vessel speed. Disruption scenarios 3B and 4B, cannot be captured accurately by 
this model and are therefore not considered further in the analysis. 
 
The payoffs obtained for the high and low fuel pricing scenarios (FP2 and FP3) are illustrated 
in Table 11 and Table 12 in the Appendix section. 
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Table 7: 𝑺𝑶𝒙 emissions cost and total payoff for FP1 scenario for all strategy 𝒊 and 𝒋 combinations 
𝑆𝑂𝑥 Payoff within ECA (m$) Total Payoff (m$) 
Disruptor  
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 
1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA  1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA 
None 0 0 0.11 None 5.22 5.17 5.03 
a1 0 0 0.14 a1 6.18 6.11 5.89 
a2 0 0 0.11 a2 5.41 5.36 5.23 
a7 0.01 0 0.2 a7 7.06 6.95 6.67 
b4 0 0 0.11 b4 5.24 5.19 5.05 
b5 0.01 0 0.17 b5 7.37 7.26 6.78 
c6 0 0 0.14 c6 8.76 8.68 8.45 
1A 0 0 0.14 1A 6.18 6.11 5.88 
2A 0 0 0.11 2A 5.41 5.36 5.23 
5B 0.01 0 0.19 5B 15.74 15.5 14.39 
6C 0 0 0.12 6C 9.23 9.15 8.87 
7D 0 0 0.1 7D 6.3 6.24 5.93 
a4 0 0 0.11 a4 5.22 5.17 5.04 
c3 0 0 0.11 c3 5.24 5.19 5.05 
c4 0 0 0.16 c4 6.13 6.05 5.74 
2D 0 0 0.11 2D 5.22 5.17 5.04 
6E 0 0 0.11 6E 5.34 5.29 5.15 
All other 0 0 0.11 All other 5.22 5.17 5.03 
 
4.2. Players mixed strategies payoffs 
 
The performance of the miniature oil supply model is considered under three fuel pricing 
scenarios, and two instances of disruption severity. The payoffs are broken down in terms of 
operational expenses (OpEx) and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 cost (which is further broken down to 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions 
cost within and out of ECAs). For the environmental policy and network resilience analysis 
undertaken, the payoffs of the conductor strategies that involve ECAs are evaluated as the sum 
of OpEx and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions cost within ECAs. For conductor strategy 3 (that doesn’t involve 
ECAs), it is considered to be in the discretion of the conductor to account or not for the coastal 
𝑆𝑂𝑥, and therefore two payoff values are obtained, one including 𝑆𝑂𝑥 and one only considering 
OpEx.  
 
The players optimal strategies to the games for all fuel pricing options and disruption intensity 
levels are summarized in Table 8. The saddle points for the low intensity games (where Nature 
is assumed to assign equal probability to all disruption strategies) are obtained by solving the 
residual linear optimization that chooses the optimal conductor strategy that minimizes 
Nature’s payoff. The optimal conductor strategy is to avoid the adoption of ECAs for all fuel 
pricing scenarios, except for FP3, where the 𝑆𝑂𝑥 cost is higher than the OpEx savings when no 
ECAs is imposed. For low fuel pricing, the conductor is better off adopting the enhanced ECAs 
with optimal vessel speed strategy (2: ECA_opt).  
 
Table 8: Optimal strategies for both players (Conductor, Nature/ Disruptor) 
3: No ECA 
Payoff … 
Intensity FP1 FP2 FP3 
… 𝑆𝑂𝑥 
Excluded 
Nature (100% 3, N/A) (100% 3, N/A) (100% 3, N/A) 
Attacker (100% 3, 100% 5B) (100% 3, 100% 5B) (100% 3, 100% 5B) 
… 𝑆𝑂𝑥 
Included 
Nature (100% 3, N/A) (100% 3, N/A) (100% 2, N/A) 
Attacker (100% 3, 100% 5B) (100% 3, 100% 5B) (100% 3, 100% 5B) 
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The saddle points for the high intensity games (where the disruptor is assumed to maximize 
his payoff) are solved by elimination by dominance, as the disruption of arc 5B is found to 
always yield the highest payoff to the attacker. The optimal strategy for the conductor is always 
to avoid the adoption of ECAs. 
 
Considering the optimal strategies for both players, the expected payoffs for the conductor are 
illustrated in Table 9. The baseline cost for operating the supply chain is considered to be the 
enhanced ECA strategy with no disruptions, 12 knots slow steaming, and optimized vessel 
speed (using LVOM). 
 
Table 9: Expected conductor payoffs and cost (shown in parenthesis) considering both player strategies 
3: No ECA 
Payoff … 
Intensity FP1 FP2 FP3 
…𝑆𝑂𝑥 
Excluded 
Nature -0.43 (5.60) -0.76 (8.79) -0.25 (2.88) 
Attacker -9.03 (14.20) -14.55 (22.58) -4.18 (6.81) 
…𝑆𝑂𝑥 
Included 
Nature -0.55 (5.72) -0.88 (8.91) -0.35 (2.98) 
Attacker -9.22 (14.39) -14.74 (22.77) -4.37 (7.00) 
Baseline 5.17 8.03 2.63 
 
4.3. Environmental policy and price sensitivity 
 
By considering three fuel pricing scenarios and observing that the optimal strategy for the 
conductor changes for the lower priced one (FP3), it is found that the conductor’s choice to 
consider ECAs or not is a function of fuel and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price. Although the proposed model does 
not account for the profits of operating the supply chain, the cost minimization considered 
advocates against the adoption of ECAs. This is because the operational cost added exceeds 
the environmental benefit achieved. This is captured in Figure 6, when squares (that represent 
the network cost for “ECA enhanced” strategy) are compared to triangles (that represent the 
No ECA including 𝑆𝑂𝑥 cost). The scatter plot of Figure 6 presents the network cost for all 
strategy 𝑖 and 𝑗 combinations against universal fleet speed for FP3.  The exponential trendlines 
of Figure 6 illustrate that for higher universal fleet speed, the two strategy payoffs diverge 
further. 
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Figure 6: Total OpEx and 𝑺𝑶𝒙 cost (m$) for FP3 for all strategy 𝒊 and 𝒋 combinations shown as a function of universal 
fleet speed required (knots) 
 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine for which 𝑆𝑂𝑥 prices, the “ECA enhanced” 
strategy becomes optimal for various disruption scenarios. Table 10 illustrates the adjustment 
in 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price required for each fuel price scenario considered.  
 
Table 10: Average 𝑺𝑶𝒙 price adjustment required for “ECA enhanced” strategy to become optimal 
Fuel Price 
Scenario 
𝑆𝑂𝑥 price adjustment ($/kg) 
Average 
1st highest 
disruption 
2nd highest 
disruption 
FP1 8.71 43.24 22.09 
FP2 13.89 59.84 31.72 
FP3 -3.48 22.45 3.18 
 
In all game scenarios examined, the attacker chooses the disruption of arc “5B” (indicated in 
the top right corner of Figure 6), and the 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price increase required to make “ECA enhanced” 
optimal is 22.45$ as shown in Table 10. This figure is substantially higher than the price 
increase required for the second highest disruption, which is a 3.18$ 𝑆𝑂𝑥 when arc “c4” is 
disrupted. It can therefore be argued that instead of setting a 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price high enough to make 
“ECA enhanced” optimal for all disruptions, an 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price that covers most disruptions is set, 
while the “No ECA” strategy is adopted for more severe disruptions. 
  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
5.1. Concluding remarks 
 
In recent years the introduction of new environmental and security regulations has influenced 
the way supply chains are operated globally. Maritime operators have been in search of optimal 
strategies to improve performance while complying with regulatory requirements in an 
increasingly complex regulatory framework. This research establishes a link between 
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environmental and network resilience performance for maritime supply chains, and provides a 
methodological framework to analyze the impact of various abatement options, regulatory and 
pricing strategies. The proposed methodology, utilizes minimum cost flow assignment and link 
speed optimization to establish operational performance and 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions cost, and a game 
theoretic model to compare various operational and environmental strategies in terms of 
network resilience.  
 
A case study is undertaken on a miniature model of the oil supply chain. The analysis confirms 
that ECA policy increases the cost to operate a supply chain. In the case study examined, using 
recent pricing it was found that ECA policy is not implemented effectively, as it is not an 
optimal choice. To become one 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emissions reduction should be valued higher. By repeating 
the analysis for various fuel pricing options, it was observed that it is in the benefit of the 
operator to not comply unless fuel pricing is very low. The lack of a link between  𝑆𝑂𝑥 price 
and fuel pricing, was determined to be the cause of this behavior, which can be overcome by 
making 𝑆𝑂𝑥 price a function of fuel pricing. A sensitivity analysis undertaken on 𝑆𝑂𝑥 pricing 
indicated price adjustments required for making ECA policy effective. 
 
The disruptor-conductor game indicated that a malevolent player can yield an increase to the 
operational cost of the network up to 280% (under the examined conditions). For all extreme 
disruptions, the conductor’s optimal strategy is found to be to avoid the implementation of 
ECAs regulation. The amount by which operational cost outweighs 𝑆𝑂𝑥 emission savings value 
is found to increase exponentially with increasing disruption severity (shown as a function of 
fleet speed in Figure 6). 
 
The proposed methodological framework can be used both for decision-making and 
performance improvement purposes. There are growing concerns on the appropriateness of 
ECAs as an environmental strategy due to potential modal shifts, increased transportation 
costs, and the lack of fairness compared to ship and port operators that are unaffected by the 
low-sulphur requirements. The proposed methodology should be used by policy makers to 
simulate the effects of suggested policies to the full network when considering alternative 
emissions abatement procedures. The case study has shown the practical applicability of the 
proposed methodology capturing how environmental legislation in one area may have 
significant indirect consequences to other areas and the global network.  
 
5.2. Limitations and future work 
 
The proposed methodology better equips policy makers to manage environmental and 
resilience legislation, and supply chain operators who consistently seek to minimise 
operational costs, also minimize their exposure to costly supply chain disruptions. The 
incapacity of the proposed flow assignment methodology to account for various vessel speeds, 
and the sub-optimality of the heuristic are recognized limitations of the model and further work 
is proposed to improve analytic accuracy and detail. It would also be interesting to examine 
the same problem in a liner shipping network, bearing in mind that certain things would need 
to be changed. For example, instead of using tonnage to define fleet capacity, one should look 
at the TEU capacity of the global liner shipping fleet. Further work is also proposed in 
determining an appropriate 𝑆𝑂𝑥 pricing strategy using real world data on supply chain 
operations and establish ways to identify which disruptions should trigger an ECA regulations 
short-term cut-off. It should be noted that the effects of SECA on sailing speed optimization 
will be more limited once the global limit is reduced to 0,5%. However, there may be additional 
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local environmental regulations coming into place in the near future that will have similar 
effects on maritime networks.  
 
 
6. Appendix 
 
Table 11: 𝑺𝑶𝒙 emissions cost and total payoff for FP2 scenario for all strategy 𝒊 and 𝒋 combinations 
𝑆𝑂𝑥 Payoff within ECA (m$) Total Payoff (m$) 
Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 
1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA  1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA 
None 0 0 0.11 None 8.08 8.03 7.83 
a1 0 0 0.14 a1 9.64 9.56 9.23 
a2 0 0 0.11 a2 8.28 8.23 8.02 
a7 0 0 0.15 a7 9.93 9.86 9.45 
b4 0 0 0.11 b4 8.11 8.06 7.86 
b5 0.01 0 0.17 b5 11.37 11.26 10.55 
c6 0 0 0.14 c6 13.74 13.66 13.32 
1A 0 0 0.14 1A 9.64 9.56 9.23 
2A 0 0 0.11 2A 8.27 8.22 8.02 
5B 0.01 0 0.19 5B 24.54 24.28 22.77 
6C 0 0 0.12 6C 14.37 14.28 13.89 
7D 0 0 0.1 7D 9.7 9.64 9.21 
c3 0 0 0.11 c3 8.11 8.06 7.85 
c4 0 0 0.16 c4 9.5 9.42 8.96 
2D 0 0 0.11 2D 8.09 8.03 7.83 
6E 0 0 0.11 6E 8.27 8.22 8.01 
All other 0 0 0.11 All other 8.08 8.03 7.83 
 
Table 12: 𝑺𝑶𝒙 emissions cost and total payoff for FP3 scenario for all strategy 𝒊 and 𝒋 combinations 
𝑆𝑂𝑥 Payoff within ECA (m$) Total Payoff (m$) 
Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 Disruptor 
strategy 𝒋 
Conductor strategy 𝒊 
1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA  1: ECA 2: ECA_opt 3: ECA 
None 0 0 0.12 None 2.67 2.63 2.64 
a1 0 0 0.14 a1 3.1 3.04 2.95 
a2 0 0 0.22 a2 2.87 2.82 3.59 
a7 0.01 0 0.21 a7 3.55 3.46 3.43 
b4 0 0 0.12 b4 2.69 2.65 2.65 
b5 0.01 0 0.3 b5 3.77 3.68 3.9 
c6 0 0 0.14 c6 4.33 4.27 4.18 
1A 0 0 0.14 1A 3.1 3.04 2.95 
2A 0 0 0.15 2A 2.94 2.9 3.22 
5B 0.01 0 0.19 5B 7.81 7.61 7 
6C 0.01 0 0.18 6C 5.24 5.14 5.05 
7D 0 0 0.18 7D 3.31 3.26 3.48 
c3 0 0 0.12 c3 2.69 2.65 2.65 
c4 0 0 0.16 c4 3.1 3.04 2.92 
6B 0 0 0.11 6B 2.67 2.63 2.59 
6E 0 0 0.12 6E 2.73 2.69 2.7 
All other 0 0 0.12 All other 2.67 2.63 2.64 
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